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ABSTRACT
In this article, the Author discusses fundamental questions of State aids in the fi eld 
of broadband network. After the short introduction, which sketches relationships 
between state aid policy and other policies, including broadband public policy, and 
after he illustrates the state of play of Slovenian broadband networks, he discusses 
main challenges in application of State aid rules to public fi nancing of broadband 
networks. In this regard, special emphasis is dedicated to legal analysis of conditions 
for the presence of State aids, and to conditions for the compatibility of State aids 
for broadband network with the Internal market. Furthermore, he emphasizes the 
importance of coherent public actions and policies in various fi elds; public policies 
shall, as far as possible, supplement each other and shall avoid their mutual colli-
sions. Unfortunately, this is not always the case as the author points out regarding 
the reckless spatial policy, which has negative effects, inter alia, on the Slovenian 
broadband networks.  
1. INTRODUCTION
Broadband networks enabling high-speed communication services are in any 
way important instrument for the achievement of many values and aims de-
fi ned by the Treaty on European Union (henceforth: TEU).1 Consequently, 
broadband networks issues are directly or at least indirectly covered by various 
EU policies and state aid policy is defi nitively one of them.2
*  Associate professor at University of Maribor, Faculty of law; ales.fercic@um.si.
1 OJ C 115, 9. 5. 2008, p. 13; see Arts. 2 and 3 TEU.
2 Already at this point, it shall be emphasized that none public policy shall be considered 
in isolation, like an ‘island’. Namely, one shall always take into consideration the interplay 
between various public policies. 
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According to the Europe 2020 Strategy and one of its fl agship initiatives, i.e. 
the Digital Agenda for Europe,3 until 2020:4
- all Europeans shall have access to Internet speeds of above 30 Mbps;
- a half or more of European households shall subscribe to Internet connec-
tions above 100 Mbps.
This ambitious objective depends on substantial investments,5 which cannot 
be provided by the market alone. At the end of the day, co-fi nancing by using 
genuine Member States’ resources seems to be unavoidable and it has to be al-
ways carried out in line with EU state aid rules. With other words, both public 
policies, namely in the fi elds of broadband and state aid, go with hand in hand.
Hence, this article discusses the application of EU state aid rules to public 
fi nancing of broadband networks where a special emphasis is dedicated to the 
analysis of two fundamental issues related to public co-fi nancing, namely to 
the conditions for presence of State aids and for compatibility of State aids 
with the internal market. These two core issues are discussed at the abstract 
level since EU state aid rules apply equally in all Member States; however, due 
to practical reasons, this article also offers insight into a state of play of the 
Slovenian broadband networks. That is to say, the present situation in Slovenia 
and strategy for the development of the next generation broadband networks 
are briefl y sketched to underline, on one hand, the importance of public funds 
for the normal functioning and development of the Slovenian broadband, and 
the limits of public fi nancing set by EU state aid rules, on the other. From the 
methodological point of view, all standard methods are used, including deduc-
tion and synthesis, in order to ensure understanding of sectorial application of 
the relevant State aid rules. 
3 COM(2010) 245 fi nal.
4 In addition, until 2013, all Europeans shall have access to basic broadband. 
5 According to the European Commission, the realization of the afore-mentioned objective 
demands up to 330 billion of euros. More precisely, an investment of between 38 and 58 billion of 
euros would need to be made to achieve 30 Mbps coverage by 2020. In addition, between 181 and 
268 billion of euros would need to be made to provide suffi cient coverage to 50% of households 
so that they have access to at least 100 Mbps services; see the Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions of 20 September 2010 – European Broadband: investing in 
digitally driven growth, COM(2010) 472 fi nal.
Of course, a reduction of investment costs due to measures defi ned by the Directive 2014/61/EU 
of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 on measures to reduce the cost of 
deploying high-speed electronic communications networks, OJ L 155, 23. 5. 2014, is possible, 
however, such a reduction can only diminish public burden but it certainly cannot fully exclude 
the need of public co-fi nancing.
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2.  STATE OF PLAY OF THE SLOVENIAN BROADBAND 
NETWORKS
The present situation6 of the Slovenian broadband networks is illustrated by 
the set of indicators presented in this chapter and, due to greater transparency, 
in the appendix of this article.
According to the selected indicators, at the end of the year 2015 only 28.5 % 
of inhabitants and 73.3 %7 of households had access to fi xed broadband for 
the Internet, which is in both cases below the EU-average. From the technical 
and technological point of view at the same time xDSL was predominant (42.5 
%),8 while among other technologies the share of FTTH was 23.9 % and the 
share of cable modem was 20.0 %. Furthermore, considering the above-men-
tioned ambitious aims related to the Internet speeds (Mbps), one should also 
take into consideration the situation at the end of the year 2015, which was 
as follows: 3.8 % of users had access to the Internet speeds below 2Mbps, 
28.6 % of users between 2 and 10 Mbps, 44.9 % of users between 10 and 30 
Mbps, and 22.5 % of users above 30 Mbps. At the same time, the households’ 
coverage with standard fi xed broadband networks was only 95.4 %, which is 
below the EU-average (96.6%). This situation is even more problematic when 
focusing on the Slovenian countryside or rural areas where the coverage is 
82.1%.9 Of course, the delicate situation of the Slovenian broadband networks 
can be explained, inter alia, by the signifi cant stagnation of investments in the 
e-communications sector, which began in the year 2009. Namely, in the year 
2009 less than 200 million of euros were invested in the e-communications 
sector, which is around 50 % less than in the year 2008 (400 million of euros). 
The bottom was reached in the year 2011 (130 million of euros). Since the year 
2011, the amount of investments is increasing; however, in the following years 
a yearly amount of investments was lower than the amount invested in the year 
2009. The situation is even more problematic since in the recent years a public 
fi nancing of the open broadband networks reached the highest level ever. This 
clearly indicates a signifi cant decrease of private fi nancing. This decrease can 
be partially explained by the global fi nancial and economic crisis, which has 
more or less affected all Member States. However, in Slovenia there is at least 
6 More precisely, the situation is illustrated for the last two years, i.e. from the 1st quarter 
of 2014 until the 4th quarter of 2015. The data are extracted from the report (Poročilo o razvoju 
trga elektronskih komunikacij za četrto četrtletje 2015, februar 2016) of the Slovenian sectoral 
regulator (Agencija za komunikacijska omrežja in storitve Republike Slovenije).
7 According to the RS-SURS research the percentage is even lower, namely 71.8 %.
8 ADSL 26.3 % and VDSL 16.2 %.
9 The EU-average is 89.6 %.
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one additional specifi c reason for the discussed decrease that is perhaps not 
clearly visible at fi rst glance, but already a bit closer look reveals one of the 
most important (structural) shortcomings, namely, sparsely populated (rural) 
areas in Slovenia, which cannot be managed overnight and can be in large 
attributed also to the reckless spatial public policy.10
Consequently, in Slovenia, there are a lot of the so called white areas, i.e. areas 
where there is no broadband infrastructure and it is unlikely to be developed in 
the near future11 without intensive public intervention. At the end of the day, the 
future development of the Slovenian broadband sector and its capacity to meet the 
afore-mentioned ambitious aims largely depends on massive public fi nancing.
3. PUBLIC FINANCING OF BROADBAND NETWORKS
Public fi nancing of broadband networks is, inter alia, subject to the EU state 
aid policy and law. In principle, each public fi nancing of broadband network 
shall be tested against EU state aid rules starting with the Art. 107(1) TFEU 
which, fi rst, cumulatively defi nes conditions for the presence of State aid, and 
second, declares State aid measures as incompatible with the Internal market, 
save as otherwise provided in the Treaties. There are numerous provisions 
which regulate conditions for exceptional compatibility of State aids with the 
Internal market; however, in a daily practice Arts. 106(2) and 107(3) TFEU 
play the most important role among the Treaty provisions defi ning exceptions. 
However, before we start to discuss the presence of State aid and its compat-
ibility with the Internal market some key procedural aspects shall be under-
lined since substantive and procedural rules are inseparably linked to each 
other. In principle, the substantive rules have to be checked and, if appropriate, 
enforced within special procedures at national and supranational level.12 EU 
state aid rules directly regulate the procedures at the supranational level only.13 
10 Of course, the similar can be said for some other sectors and types of infrastructure for elec-
tricity, natural gas and fresh water. Therefore, in addition to various public policies, also the 
Slovenian spatial public policy shall consider this problem.
11 The near future is interpreted as a period of three years.
12 With other words, procedural rules serve as an instrument for the implementation or en-
forcement of substantive rules.
13 See in particular the Art. 108 TFEU, and the Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of 13 
July 2015 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (OJ EU, L 248, 24.9.2015, p. 9), and the Commission Reg-
ulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 
laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (OJ EU, L 140, 30.4.2004, p. 1–134, and amendments).
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However, although the supranational rules do not directly regulate national 
procedures concerning State aid cases one can still recognize their indirect 
infl uence on the national (procedural) law due to the Member States’ obliga-
tions according to the Art. 108(3) TFEU.14 Implementation of these obliga-
tions depends on credible data regarding State aid grants within the individual 
Member State and for this reason, Member States usually introduce national 
notifi cation or reporting systems. Such systems are a general precondition for 
the realization of the notifi cation and stand-still obligations. Namely, Member 
States shall inform the European Commission of any plans to grant a new aid 
or to alter existing one, and in addition, they shall not put their proposed mea-
sures into effect until the special European Commission’s procedure results in 
a positive15 fi nal decision, except if block exemption conditions are met.16 If 
the said notifi cation and/or stand-still obligation is breached then a given aid 
is unlawful17 and, in principle, it has to be effectively recovered in due time to-
gether with the corresponding interests.18 The same is true when the European 
Commission, as regards to a given unlawful State aid, decides that such aid is 
not compatible with the internal market and it takes a negative fi nal decision.19 
14 Namely, the notifi cation obligation and stand-still obligation. In addition, general princi-
ples like primacy and effectiveness of EU law, which limits the principle of procedural auton-
omy or competence, indirectly infl uence the national procedural law.
15 Or at least conditional decision, however, in this case lawfulness of a given State aid de-
pends upon prior fulfi lment of prescribed conditions.
16 Similar can be said in case de minimis conditions are met. However, to be precise, de mi-
nimis aid is not State aid within the meaning of the Art. 107(1) TFEU since such an aid do not 
suffi ciently distort competition or/and affect the trade between Member States. 
17 An unlawful State aid shall be strictly distinguished from an aid which is incompatible with the 
internal market. To simplify, the former occurs in case of a breach of procedural rules, i.e. of rules 
establishing the notifi cation and stand-still obligations (Art. 108(3) TFEU), and the latter occurs in 
case of a breach of substantive rules (Art. 107(1) TFEU). The Member State’s courts have compe-
tence to rule on lawfulness of a given State aid, and within this context they may decide, whether 
a given measure shall be considered as the State aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU, con-
sidering also de minimis aid, and whether a given State aid can benefi t from the block exemption. If 
a national court fi nds out that a given State aid is unlawful, it may, inter alia, order its recovery to-
gether with interests, and in addition, it can also rule on compensation of damage. Moreover, before 
the national courts negative fi nal decisions of the European Commission, ordering the recovery of a 
particular State aid, shall be implemented (unless this can be exceptionally done solely by national 
administrative bodies). The European Commission has, however, the exclusive competence to rule 
on compatibility of a given State aid with the Internal market.
18 The interest rates are defi ned by the European Commission.
19 If the European Commission declares a given unlawful State aid as compatible with the 
Internal market, only interest shall be recovered, namely from the date on which the unlawful 
aid was at the disposal of the benefi ciary until the date of a positive or, if given conditions are 
met, of conditional fi nal decision.
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The said recovery obligation is also imposed if a legal or authorized state aid 
is misused. The failure of the said recovery can have a blocking effect, namely, 
the European Commission cannot decide upon the compatibility with the in-
ternal market of a new aid as long as the old unlawful aid has not been repaid,20 
and it can also have a fi nancial effect, namely, a lump-sum or penalty payment. 
In addition, any competitor or impaired person may claim for restitution of 
damages according to the national law of obligations.21 
Since it is obvious that a breach of the state aid rules can lead to several sig-
nifi cant legal consequences, there is certainly reasonable to act in line with the 
said rules. Of course, understanding of these rules is a precondition to perform 
public fi nancing of broadband networks within a safe harbour. For this reason, 
this article discuses fundamental questions related to the presence of State aid 
(3.1.) and its compatibility with the Internal market (3.2.).
3.1. PRESENCE OF STATE AID
Presence of State aid shall be tested case-by-case by careful examination of 
all criteria as defi ned in the Art. 107(1) TFEU. Namely, the Art. 107(1) TFEU 
sketches contours of the State aid concept by determining it as any aid granted 
by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods in so far as it affects trade between Member 
States. An analysis of the said article reveals various conditions that must be 
met for the existence of State aid, namely there must be an aid:
- granted by a Member State or through State resources,
- received by at least one undertaking, offering it an economic benefi t or advantage,
- having selective effect by favouring only certain undertakings, 
- having potential to distort competition, and
- having potential to affect trade between Member States.
These conditions are defi ned cumulatively22 and therefore each of them can be 
considered as a condition sine qua non. For practical reasons, this article briefl y 
20 This is the so called Deggendorf rule.
21 For more on national court proceedings see the Commission notice on the enforcement of 
State aid law by national courts (OJ EU, C 85, 9.4.2009, p. 1–22) and the Notice from the Com-
mission — Towards an effective implementation of Commission decisions ordering Member 
States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid (OJ EU, C 272, 15.11.2007, p. 4–17).
22 See for example cases: C-206/06,  Essent Netwerk Noord BV, 2008, ECR I-5497; case 
T-309, 317, 329 in 336/04, TV2, 2008, ECR II-2935; and the XXVIth Report on Competition 
Policy (1996), paragraph 166.
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discusses all the stated conditions in order to mark out the outer contours of the 
said autonomous concept of EU law,23 however, the emphasis is made on those as-
pects which are of utmost importance for public fi nancing of broadband network. 
As already mentioned, the fi rst condition of the fi ve step test is related to State 
resources, or more precisely to any kind of aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources (e.g. direct grant, tax rebate, soft loan or other type of 
preferential fi nancing conditions). An individual aid can be granted directly by 
a central, regional or local authority, or indirectly, for example through a public 
undertaking. However, an observed public measure or action must burden24 State 
or public resources,25 and it must be attributable or imputable to a national public 
authority, otherwise there is no State aid.26 An aid burdens public resources if 
a particular public measure or action is fi nanced by a public authority resulting 
in higher public outgoings or lower revenues.27 Furthermore, an aid is imputable 
to a public authority if a decision to grant an individual aid is taken by a public 
authority or, when an aid is granted indirectly, if a public authority actually28 
exercises dominant infl uence over a public undertaking or another entity.29 
23 As in all other cases when dealing with autonomous concepts of EU law, such a concept 
must be interpreted widely and with due respect of the Court’s and Commission’s practice. 
That is to say, independently of any similar national concepts, if there are any.
24 At least potentially, like for example in case of public guarantees.
25 For the explanation of State or public resources see for example cases: C-83/98 P, Ladbroke 
Racing, 2000, ECR I-3271; T-358/94, Air France, 1996, ECR II-2109.
26 See for example cases: C-379/98, PreussenElektra, 2001, ECR I-2099; C-222/07, UTECA, 
2009, ECR I-1407; C-482/99, Stardust Marine, 2002, ECR I-4397.
27 Since in a daily practice also European structural and investments funds can be used for public 
fi nancing of broadband networks it is worthy to point out that even European funds, such as the Eu-
ropean Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Regional Development Fund, 
can constitute State resources when these funds are allocated at a Member State’s discretion. That 
is to say, if a Member State can autonomously fulfi ll the wide framework as defi ned by EU law and, 
as a consequence, it can use or allocate sources received from European funds, such funds become 
State’s funds (existence of outer limits set by EU law is not decisive in this regard).
28 Even if a public authority is in a position to control a public undertaking and to exercise a 
dominant infl uence over its operations, actual exercise of that control in a particular case can-
not be automatically presumed. A public undertaking may act with more or less independence, 
according to the degree of autonomy left to it by a public authority. Therefore, the mere fact 
that a public undertaking is under public authority’s control is not suffi cient for measures taken 
by that undertaking to be imputed to a public authority. It is also necessary to examine whether 
the public authorities must be regarded as having been involved, in one way or another, in the 
adoption of those measures. See case C-482/99, Stardust Marine, 2002, ECR I-4397.
29 The Court has ruled that the said ‘imputability’ may be inferred from a set of indicators 
arising from the circumstances of the case and the context in which that measure was taken, 
and at the same time it has offered several relevant indicators. See case C-482/99, Stardust 
Marine, 2002, ECR I-4397.
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The second condition of the fi ve step test is related to an economic benefi t or 
advantage received directly or indirectly30 by at least one undertaking31 which 
it would not have received from its own commercial endeavour within a given 
market in the normal course of business, including also situations where a 
gratuitous advantage results from the mitigation of charges which are normal-
ly included in an undertaking’s budget. An advantage will be gained where, 
as a result of the aid, the benefi ciary’s net fi nancial position is improved, or, 
even where there is no actual improvement in the benefi ciary’s position, where, 
without the aid, that position would have deteriorated. When analysing a bene-
fi ciary’s fi nancial position, or better to say a change of that position, a point of 
departure must necessarily be a competitive position existing within a relevant 
market before the adoption of the measure in issue. However, if its fi nancial 
position is improved because of a public measure or conduct, this is not au-
tomatically a proof of the said advantage, since a profi t is an ultimate aim of 
any business activity and its desired companion. Yet, in this regard a gained 
profi t must be of reasonable extent. For that reason, it is necessary to distin-
guish between an ordinary and extraordinary advantage. Only the latter, i.e. 
the qualifi ed advantage is relevant for the purpose of the Art. 107(1) TFEU. Its 
assessment is far from trivial task, and in this regard special tests are needed 
as developed by the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the 
EU. In principle, the private undertaking test32 is used for the assessment of 
ordinary commercial activities, and the SGEI or Altmark test33 is used for the 
30 For example, when third-party operators receive wholesale access to the subsidized infra-
structure.
31 Undertaking is an entity performing at least one economic activity, i.e. offering goods or/
and services within a given market, regardless of its legal status or form, ownership and a way 
of fi nancing. The construction of a broadband network infrastructure with a view of its future 
commercial exploitation by the State or third-party operators, also constitutes an economic ac-
tivity, while the roll-out of a broadband network for non-commercial purposes might not con-
stitute State aid, because the network construction does not favour any undertaking. However, 
if such a network is subsequently opened for the use of broadband investors or operators, State 
aid is likely to be involved. See the Communication from the Commission – EU Guidelines for 
the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ 
EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, p. 3.
32 This test has several modalities, e.g. private investor test (market economy investor test), 
private creditor test, private purchaser test, private vendor test, private guarantor test, etc. In 
all these cases, the benchmark is a rational private undertaking aiming at reasonable profi t in 
mid- or long-term period, accepting reasonable risk.
33 The Altmark test was fi rst introduced in the case C-280/00, ECR 2003, I-7747, as a tool 
used to distinguish between State aids and aid-free measures; an individual compensation 
escapes qualifi cation as State aid if all four conditions are met:
- fi rst, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge, 
and the obligations must be clearly defi ned […];
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assessment of public fi nancing of public services. Of course, in the fi eld of 
broadband network one can imagine cases in which one34 or the other35 of both 
tests applies. At this point it is also worthy to clarify the function and limits 
- second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be estab-
lished in advance in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an economic 
advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over competing undertakings […];
- third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs 
incurred in the discharge of public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts 
and a reasonable profi t […];
- fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations, in a specif-
ic case, is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the 
selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, 
the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs 
which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to 
be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging 
those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profi t for discharg-
ing the obligations. […].
Regarding the above mentioned conditions it is also worthy to point out the Communication 
from the Commission – EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the 
rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, which offers further clar-
ifi cation as to some of these conditions, i.e. to the defi nition of services of general economic 
interest (paragraphs 19 – 25) and to the calculation of compensation and clawback (paragraphs 
26 and 27).
34 I.e. private undertaking test in cases of recapitalization, guarantee, soft loan etc.
35 I.e. Altmark test in cases where Member States or their public authorities consider that 
the provision of a broadband network should be regarded as a service of a general economic 
interest within the meaning of the Art. 106(2) TFEU and the Altmark case and provide public 
funding on this basis. In this regard it shall be emphasized that although Member States enjoy a 
relatively wide discretion regarding the defi nition of services of general economic interest they 
have to consider the outer limits of the autonomous concept of EU law. Since the ‘exemption’ 
as defi ned by the Art. 106(2) TFEU could jeopardize the effectiveness of EU law, if applied 
wrongly or abusively; the European Commission and Court of Justice of the EU put their 
attention on manifest errors. In principle, the European Commission  has  already  clarifi ed, 
that  Member  States  cannot  attach  specifi c  public  service  obligations  to  services  that  are 
already  provided  or  can  be  provided  satisfactorily  and  under  conditions,  such  as  price, 
objective  quality  characteristics,  continuity  and  access  to  the  service,  consistent  with  the 
public  interest,  as  defi ned  by  the  State,  by  undertakings  operating  under  normal  market 
conditions. Of course, this logic applies also for deployment of broadband network and, as a 
consequence, in areas where private investors have already invested in a broadband network 
and are largely providing competitive broadband services with an adequate broadband cover-
age, setting up a parallel competitive and publicly funded broadband infrastructure cannot be 
considered as a service of general economic interest, except in cases where it can be demon-
strated that private investors are not in position to provide in the near future, i.e. in the period 
of three years, an adequate broadband coverage to all users (consumers and undertakings) in a 
given area, thus leaving a signifi cant part of the users outside the circle. In principle, only the 
so called white spots or areas are ‘eligible’ (yet, there is a little space for exceptions, mostly due 
to the ‘near future’ argument). 
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of competitive selection process, since the latter is often used for the selection 
of the best bidder. Such a process, when applied in the fi eld of broadband net-
work, does not guarantee that there is no economic advantage or benefi t within 
the meaning of the Art. 107(1) TFEU but only that such benefi t is limited to the 
minimum amount necessary for the particular project.
The third condition of the fi ve step test is related to a selective favouring of 
certain undertakings, where certain advantage is not granted to all relevant un-
dertakings within the observed Member State.36 Therefore, the said condition 
is met in cases of unfounded legal or factual differentiation between undertak-
ings which are in a comparable position. In principle, there are two kind of se-
lectivity, namely the material and regional selectivity. The material selectivity 
encompasses the sectorial selectivity, i.e. measures limited to certain sectors 
only, but also the de facto selectivity, i.e. measures limited to certain catego-
ries of undertakings, e.g. to small and medium-sized undertakings or to newly 
created companies. On the other hand, the regional selectivity encompasses 
measures that favour only undertakings located in particular area. However, it 
is important to point out that selective measures meet their antipode in general 
measures.37 The latter do not constitute State aids within the meaning of the 
Art. 107(1) TFEU. Considering what was just said, state measures support-
ing the deployment of broadband networks are selective in nature in that they 
target broadband investors and third-party operators which are active only in 
certain segments of the overall electronic communications services market.38 
The fourth condition of the fi ve step test is related to a (potential) distortion of 
competition. The said condition is met if a public measure or conduct is capa-
ble to infl uence existing competition relationships within at least one relevant 
market, or if it is capable to prevent or hinder the formation of new competition 
relationships within such market. The said distortion of competition occurs 
36 A regional or local unit of particular Member State can be only exceptionally considered 
as the reference system. See for example cases: C-88/03, Azores, 2006, ECR I-7115; C-428-
434/06, Rioja, 2008, ECR I-6747.
37 See more in Bartosch, 2010: 729-752; Bousin and Piernas, 2008: 634-653; Kurcz and Val-
lindas, 2008: 159-182.
38 The situation is less straightforward when it comes to business end-users of the subsi-
dized network since for them the measure might not be selective as long as the access to the 
subsidized infrastructure is open to all sectors of the economy. With other words, selectivity 
will exist if broadband deployment is specifi cally addressed to dedicated business users, for 
instance if the State support is geared toward the deployment of a broadband network in favour 
of predetermined companies which are not chosen according to general criteria applicable in 
the entire area for which the granting authority is responsible. See the Communication from 
the Commission – EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid 
deployment of broadband networks, OJ EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, p. 4.
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because of a public intervention which, within a given relevant market, is ca-
pable to improve or at least to preserve a competition position of one or more 
aid-benefi ciaries in comparison to their competitors who have not received 
such aid, or which is capable to prevent or hinder an entry of new competitors. 
According to the Court’s practice already a small amount of aid is capable to 
distort a competition, in particular within relevant markets where degree of 
competition is high. However, at this point it is worthy to mention the so called 
de minimis aid, as defi ned by special regul ations.39 Namely, aid measures shall 
be deemed not to meet all the conditions of Art. 107(1) TFEU, i.e. the con-
ditions of potential distortion of competition or of potential effect on trade 
between Member States, and shall therefore be exempt from the notifi cation 
requirement of the Art. 108(3) TFEU, if they fulfi l the conditions laid down 
in particular de minimis regulation. Since broadband sector in the EU is, in 
principle, highly competitive it is relatively safe to say that usually the fourth 
condition is easy to ‘tick off’.
The fi fth condition of the fi ve step test is related to a (potential) effect on trade 
between Member States. An aid is capable to affect the trade between two 
or more Member States if it actually causes, or at least threatens to cause a 
change of pattern in the cross-border trade, where the concept of trade shall 
be interpreted widely, i.e. as an economic activity related to goods, services 
or capital. The said situation can occur if an aid results in an improved market 
position of benefi ciary in comparison to its competitors in another Member 
State, what is only possible if a relevant market is extended over two or more 
Member States. In this case, the cross-border trade can be affected also in case 
if a benefi ciary exercises its economic activity solely in one Member State. 
Similar, as already said within the previous condition, the Court’s practice 
shows that already a small amount of aid can affect the trade between Member 
States, except in cases of the de minimis aid as defi ned by special regulations.40 
What is more, similar as with the fourth condition also here is relatively safe to 
say that in most cases this condition is easy to ‘tick off’.
In short, the public fi nancing of broadband network is qualifi ed as State aid 
within the meaning of the Art. 107(1) TFEU if all above discussed conditions 
39 See for example the Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on 
the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid (OJ, L 352, 24. 12. 2013, 
p. 1); and the Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis 
aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest OJ, L 114, 26. 4. 
2012, p. 8). 
40 See supra, footnote No. 39.
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are met. Thus, for greater clarity let us repeat that the act of public authority41 
is not the State aid in case of:
- recapitalization, loan, guarantee or any other classical commercial conduct 
which can be considered as a normal market conduct on the basis of the 
private undertaking test,
- compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic 
interest which corresponds to the Altmark test,
- de minimis aid,
- aid for broadband network for non-commercial use,42
- regulatory and administrative measures, according to the Directive 2014/61/
EU.43 
Public measures which are not qualifi ed as State aid within the meaning of 
Art. 107(1) TFEU do not fall under the Art. 108(3) TFEU; there is no obliga-
tion to notify such measures to the European Commission and to wait with 
their realization until the fi nal European Commission’s decision. Quiet oppo-
site, public measures which are qualifi ed as (new) State aid within the meaning 
of Art. 107(1) TFEU are subject to the notifi cation and stand-still obligation 
according to the Art. 108(3) TFEU, except in cases when all conditions, as 
defi ned by EU regulation44 or other act,45 for the so called block exemption are 
met.46 The notifi cation and stand-still obligations are defi ned in order to ensure 
the assessment of compatibility of a given new State aid with the Internal mar-
ket. European Commission has the exclusive power for such an assessment.
41 And even of public undertaking in case its act can be imputed to the public authority.
42 However, if this network is subsequently opened for the use of broadband investors or op-
erators, State aid is possible.
43 See supra, footnote No. 5.
44 See for example the Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring 
certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 
108 of the Treaty, OJ EU, L 187, 26. 6. 2014, p. 1.
45 See for example Commission Decision (2012/21/EU) of 20 December 2011 on the appli-
cation of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid 
in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest, OJ EU, L 7, 11. 1. 2012, p. 3.
46 In such a case a given State aid is deemed to be compatible with the Internal market and no 
notifi cation to European Commission (and stand-still) is needed.
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3.2. COMPATIBILITY OF STATE AID WITH THE INTERNAL MARKET
Compatibility of State aid with the Internal market is further fundamental 
question in the fi eld of State aid, which has to be answered on case-by-case 
basis if the answer to the former fundamental question, i.e. regarding the pres-
ence of State aid, is affi rmative.47 In essence, the question of compatibility 
addresses the treatment of State aids in the European model of social market 
economy. Or to put it simply, are State aid treated as a poison or remedy? The 
answer is to be found in the Art. 107(1) TFEU, which declares State aids as 
incompatible with the Internal market, save as otherwise provided in the Trea-
ties. Thus, there is no straightforward answer to this question and once more a 
case-by-case approach is needed. 
TFEU defi nes numerous cases in which a State aids can be declared as com-
patible with the Internal market and, as a consequence, in a daily practice 
State aids play important role in the fi eld of various public policies where they 
are used as an instrument for the realization of public aims.48 Of course, not 
all provisions of the TFEU, defi ning conditions for exceptional compatibility 
of State aids with the Internal market, are applicable for public fi nancing of 
broadband networks. There is, however, no doubt that in the fi eld of broadband 
networks the Arts. 106(2) and 107(3) TFEU are of utmost importance for the 
assessment of compatibility of State aids with the Internal market.
3.2.1. Art. 106(2) TFEU
Art. 106(2) TFEU states that undertakings entrusted with the operation of ser-
vices of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-pro-
ducing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in 
particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules 
does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks as-
signed to them, and that the development of trade must not be affected to such 
an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the EU.
As already said, in some cases a Member State may consider that the provision 
of a broadband network should be regarded as a service of a general economic 
interest and it may provide public funding on this basis; however, such a fund-
ing shall be performed according to the Art. 106(2) TFEU. Since the latter 
defi nes an exception (namely, a non-application the Treaty provisions, like for 
47 Which means we are dealing with certain State aid in a real life situation.
48 In this regard, I think the way of how the EU has tackled with the global fi nancial and 
economic crisis speaks for itself. 
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example of non-application of (certain) State aid rules), it shall be interpreted 
narrowly. In order to ensure a greater clarity, the European Commission has 
issued the so-called second SGEI package (also known as the Almunia pack-
age),49 which combines hard law and soft law instruments. However, only two 
of four instruments are directly relevant from the compatibility assessment 
perspective, namely the Decision, which has a function of a block exemption, 
and the Framework, which reveals the European Commission’s way of inter-
pretation of the Art. 106(2) TFEU within its compatibility assessment proce-
dure. Of course, since the both instruments follow a horizontal or let us say 
all-sectors approach, in some cases certain adjustments are needed when they 
are used in the fi eld of broadband network.50
3.2.2. Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU
Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU is the most appropriate legal basis for the declaration of 
certain State aid, granted in the fi eld of broadband network, as being compati-
ble with the Internal market (except in cases of services of general interest, see 
supra, chapter 2.1.). Indeed, one could imagine broadband cases where also 
certain other sub-paragraphs of the Art. 107(3) TFEU could apply, like for ex-
ample the Art. 107(3)(a) TFEU, however, in a daily practice the Art. 107(3)(c) 
TFEU is certainly most frequently used. It enables exceptional compatibility 
of State aids, which facilitate the development of certain economic activities 
or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading 
conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest. Thus, the positive 
49 The Almunia package is consisted of four instruments: 
- Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid 
rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, OJ 
EU, C 8, 11. 1. 2012, p. 4;
- Commission Decision of 20 December on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation 
granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest, OJ EU,  L 7, 11. 1. 2012, p. 3;
- Communication from the Commission, European Union framework for State aid in the 
form of public service compensation (2011), OJ EU, C 8, 11. 1. 2012, p. 15;
- Commission Regulation on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing ser-
vices of general economic interest, OJ EU, L 114, 26. 4. 2012, p. 8.
See Ferčič, A., Samec, N., European State Aid Law and Policy, and Local Public Services, Lex 
Localis, No. 2/2014, p. 267 – 287.
50 See for example paragraphs 19 – 27 of the Communication from the Commission – EU 
Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broad-
band networks, OJ EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, p. 3.
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impact of the aid measure in reaching an objective of common interest shall 
outweigh its potential negative side effects, such as distortions of competition 
and cross-border trade. In this regard, the principle of proportionality (which, 
in a nutshell, demands a legitimate aim, a measure appropriate to achieve this 
aim and its necessity, and an over-plus of positive over negative effects) is of 
crucial importance. This principle can be well recognized in the compatibility 
test within the Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU, which contains the following conditions:51
- contribution to the achievement of objectives of common interest,
- absence of market delivery due to market failures or important inequalities,
- appropriateness of State aid as a policy instrument,
- existence of incentive effect,
- aid limited to the minimum necessary,
- limited negative effects,
- transparency.
These conditions are defi ned cumulatively and, therefore, in case an observed 
State aid fails to comply with one of these conditions it is automatically incom-
patible with the Internal market. However, if in particular case all of these con-
ditions are fulfi lled, the fi nal step has to be done, namely, weighting of positive 
and negative effects. Only in case the overall balance of all effects is positive, 
the observed State aid can be declared as compatible with the Internal market.
The above-mentioned conditions and the weighting of relevant effects are dis-
cussed in the following sub-chapters.52
3.2.2.1. Contribution to the achievement of objectives of common interest
Contribution to the achievement of objectives of common interest is the fi rst 
condition of the so called compatibility test within the Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU. 
Objectives of common interest are to be found within the ‘collection’ of EU 
aims as defi ned in the Treaties and further elaborated in EU acts, such as in the 
Europe 2020 Strategy and, even more specifi c and relevant for the broadband, 
in the Digital Agenda for Europe.
51 Some of the elements of the ‘general’ principle of proportionality are dissected and sup-
plemented with specifi cs of sectoral approach, however, the core logic and elements of the 
principle of proportionality are still to be recognized.
52 See also the paragraphs 36 – 54 of the Communication from the Commission – EU Guide-
lines for the application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband 
networks, OJ EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, p. 3.
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It should be emphasized, however, the mere fact that a certain aim can be 
found within the Treaties or in other EU acts, which in particular case princi-
pally labels such aim as a legitimate one, does not automatically mean it has to 
be followed and realized without any further considerations. Namely, there are 
numerous legitimate aims and not all are compatible with each other. In case 
of a collision between two or more legitimate aims a case-by-case trade-off or 
ranking between the confl icting legitimate aims shall be carefully exercised. 
As to this ranking, it should be explicitly pointed out that in the model of social 
market economy, as underlined in the Art. 3(3) TEU, economic goals should 
not enjoy a priori primacy over non-economic goals and vice versa.
3.2.2.2. Absence of a desired market delivery due to market failures or im-
portant inequalities
Absence of a desired market delivery due to market failures or important in 
inequalities are often discussed as parallel undesired situations, although at the 
end of the day also the inequality can be at least to certain extent attributed to 
market failure. Market has economic nature and it is certainly not capable to 
realize all legitimate aims, in particular not those of social policy or of other 
non-economic public policies.
In the broadband sector, similar like in many other (infrastructure) sectors, 
positive externalities arise where market players do not internalize the whole 
benefi t of their investment or actions. Consequently, private investment is not 
as appealing as desired. What is more, due to economics of density, the de-
ployment of broadband networks is generally more profi table in cities, that is to 
say in urban areas with high density of population, while rural areas with low 
density of population cannot be supplied with profi t because of high fi xed costs 
of investment which cannot be recovered by small number of users.53 Conse-
quently, in (rural) areas with low density of population there is no service at all 
or perhaps there is a service, however its price is signifi cantly higher than in 
urban areas. Of course, none of these two scenarios are in line with the Digital 
Agenda for Europe and its ambitious aims, and at the end of the day, the public 
intervention is needed with respect of valid legal framework, including also 
State aid rules. As already said, there are a lot of the so called white spots in 
Slovenia, in many cases also because of the reckless spatial policy, which have 
to be supplied with state support in one way or another, in most cases with 
direct use of public funds. 
53 Unit costs would be simply too high.
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3.2.2.3. Appropriateness of State aid as a policy instrument
Appropriateness of State aid as a policy instrument is usual element of the 
proportionality test. That is to say, an observed measure shall be designed in a 
way which makes it capable to realize the legitimate aim in question. In some 
cases, State aid is only measure which can overcome the lack of broadband 
connectivity.54 
From the appropriateness perspective, one shall also consider the importance 
of proper horizontal and vertical coordination between various public author-
ities and their organs in order to avoid duplications and incoherence of mea-
sures. It is highly welcome that a competent (central) body at the state level 
issues a national framework scheme and guidelines for broadband develop-
ment across the whole territory of the state, which enables transparency as a 
precondition for coherent activities. 
In addition, one shall also point out special roles in designing of pro-com-
petitive State aid measures of both, national regulatory authority and nation-
al competition authority. On one hand, the former shall in particular support 
public authorities with regard to the State aid schemes and should be consulted 
when target areas are being identifi ed. They should be consulted with regard to 
determining the wholesale access prices and conditions as well as with regard 
to solving disputes between access seekers and the subsidized infrastructure 
operator. Moreover, national regulatory agency shall issue guidelines for local 
authorities, which include recommendations on market analysis, wholesale ac-
cess products and pricing principles. On the other hand, national competition 
authority shall for example give advice regarding large framework schemes 
to help establishing a level playing fi eld for the bidding operators and to avoid 
that a disproportionately high share of State funds is earmarked to one oper-
ator, thereby strengthening its market position (which usually already corre-
sponds to the concept of dominant position within the meaning of the Art. 
102 TFEU). Of course, in addition to these two authorities there is still space 
for other bodies offering support, e.g. for national competence centers whose 
mission is to help small (usually local) authorities, facing with lack of staff, 
knowledge and experiences,55 to design adequate State aid measures and to 
ensure consistent application of State aid rules.
54 There are, however, cases where also other measures are appropriate and in such cases the 
mildest measure among appropriate measures shall be used (element of necessity).
55 And at the same time with lack of fi nancial resources needed to acquire consulting services 
on the market.
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3.2.2.4. Existence of incentive effect
Existence of incentive effect, as one of the conditions of the compatibility 
test in the fi eld of broadband network, is mainly centered at the examination 
of whether the desired broadband network investment would not have been 
undertaken within the same time-frame without any State aid. There is for 
example no relevant incentive effect in case an operator is already subject to 
certain obligations to cover the target area.56
3.2.2.5. Aid limited to the minimum necessary
Aid limited to the minimum necessary is a condition which can only be as-
sessed with careful consideration of different areas, i.e. white, grey and black 
areas, and of different types of broadband networks, i.e. basic networks57 and 
next generation access networks.58  
In case of basic broadband networks the following shall be, inter alia, consid-
ered.
- White areas: in principle, the public intervention is welcome here from the 
territorial cohesion and economic development perspective or more pre-
cisely, because of the ambitious aims set by the Digital Agenda for Europe 
discussed in the fi rst chapter of this article. However, such intervention has 
to be performed according to the strict legal framework which demands: 
56 This is even more so, if operator has already received fi nancial aid to cover necessary in-
vestments in the network since double fi nancing of the same thing is not allowed.
57 Several different technology platforms can be considered as basic broadband networks 
including asymmetric digital subscriber lines (up to ADSL2+ networks), non-enhanced cable 
(e.g. DOCSIS 2.0), mobile networks of third generation (UMTS) and satellite systems.
58 Networks which rely wholly or partly on optical elements and which are capable of deliv-
ering broadband access services with enhanced characteristics as compared to existing basic 
broadband networks. NGA networks are understood to have at least the following charac-
teristics: (i) deliver services reliably at a very high speed per subscriber through optical (or 
equivalent technology) backhaul suffi ciently close to user premises to guarantee the actual 
delivery of the very high speed; (ii) support a variety of advanced digital services including 
converged all-IP services; and (iii) have substantially higher upload speeds (compared to basic 
broadband networks). At the current stage of market and technological development, NGA 
networks are: (i) fi bre-based access networks (FTTx); (ii) advanced upgraded cable networks; 
and (iii) certain advanced wireless access networks capable of delivering reliable high speeds 
per subscriber. It is important to bear in mind that in the longer term NGA networks are ex-
pected to supersede existing basic broadband networks and not just to upgrade them. See the 
Communication from the Commission – EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in 
relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, p. 3.
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detailed mapping and analysis of coverage, public consultation, competitive 
selection process, use of most economically advantageous offer criteria, 
technological neutrality, use of existing infrastructure, wholesale access 
(pricing), monitoring and clawback mechanism, transparency and report-
ing.59 A failure to meet any of these conditions would most likely require 
an in-depth assessment within the procedure according to the Art. 108(2) 
TFEU, which could result in a conclusion that the aid is incompatible with 
the Internal market.
- Grey areas: the public intervention in grey areas can generate either posi-
tive effects (neutralization of market failure or strengthening of territorial 
cohesion) or negative effects (distortion of competition and obstruction of 
market dynamics), therefore, even more detailed assessment as in case of 
white areas is needed. This assessment is performed at two levels. At fi rst 
level it has to be proved that no affordable or adequate services are offered 
to satisfy the needs of citizens or business users, and that there are no less 
distortive measures available (including ex ante regulation) to reach the 
same goals.60 In case in particular case both conditions are satisfi ed, the 
second level assessment follows where the same conditions, as those for 
public intervention in white areas, are examined.
- Black areas: in principle, the public intervention in black areas is not need-
ed and there is also no need for the assessment since it is assumed that no 
market failure exists. With other words, in the absence of a clearly demon-
strated market failure, the European Commission will take a negative view 
of measures to fund the roll-out of an additional broadband infrastructure 
in a ‘black area’. 
59 See paragraph 78 of the Communication from the Commission – EU Guidelines for the 
application of State aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ 
EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, p. 3.
60 For this reason the European Commission assess in particular whether:
- the overall market conditions are not adequate, by looking, inter alia, into the level of cur-
rent broadband prices, the type of services offered to end-users (residential and business users) 
and the conditions attached thereto;
- in the absence of ex ante regulation imposed by an national regulatory authority, effective 
network access is not offered to third parties or access conditions are not conducive to effective 
competition;
- overall entry barriers preclude the potential entry of other electronic communication oper-
ators; and
- any  measures  taken  or  remedies  imposed  by  the  competent  national  regulatory  or 
competition  authority  with  regard  to  the  existing  network  provider  have  not  been  able 
to  overcome  such  problems.
See the Communication from the Commission – EU Guidelines for the application of State aid 
rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, p. 3.
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In case of next generation access networks the following shall be, inter alia, 
considered.
- White areas: the public intervention is only admissible in case two spe-
cial conditions, in addition to all general conditions as presented above 
(in case of white areas concerning basic broadband networks), are met. 
Namely, effective wholesale access for third-party operators, and fair and 
non-discriminatory treatment, what is of particular importance in case the 
observed network operator is vertically integrated.
- Grey areas: in assessing whether other network investors could deploy ad-
ditional next generation networks in a given area, account should be taken 
of any existing regulatory or legislative measures that may have lowered 
barriers for such network deployments (access to ducts, sharing of infra-
structure, etc.). The European Commission will need to carry out a more 
detailed analysis in order to verify whether State intervention is needed 
since State intervention in such areas carries a high risk of crowding out 
existing investors and distorting competition.61 
- Black areas: State aid is not necessary; it can seriously distort competition, 
save as otherwise proved, and therefore it is incompatible with the internal 
market under Article 107(3)(c) of the TFEU. However, it has to be empha-
sized that the situation is signifi cantly different in case of next generation 
access network enabling ultra-fast speeds above 100 Mbps; namely, in such 
case the State aid is deemed to be compatible with the Internal market if 
special conditions are met, which can ensure, in a nutshell, a signifi cant du-
rable and sustainable technological progress which improves competition.62 
3.2.2.6 Limited negative effects
Limited negative effects are related to competitors and their behavior regard-
ing the existing of future investments and, in some cases, even their (non-)pres-
ence within the market. State aid shall not affect competitors in a way that they 
decrease the extent of planned investments or even retreat from the market.
61 See the Communication from the Commission – EU Guidelines for the application of State 
aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, 
p. 3. 
62 See paragraphs 83 – 85 of the Commission – EU Guidelines for the application of State aid 
rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, p. 3. 
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3.2.2.7. Transparency 
Transparency means, fi rst of all, that state aid shall be awarded in a (suffi cient-
ly) transparent manner; it must be ensured that the Member States, economic 
operators, the interested public and the European Commission have easy access 
to all relevant acts and pertinent information about the aid awarded thereunder. 
3.2.2.8. Overall weighting or balancing of relevant effects
Overall weighting or balancing of relevant effects is a fi nal step of the above-men-
tioned compatibility assessment. The fi nal step of the assessment follows the same 
logic as the general principle of proportionality (more precisely, its fi nal element, 
i.e. proportionality in the narrow sense). Of course, the State aid can only be de-
clared as compatible with the Internal market in case positive effects as attached to 
the achievement of the legitimate aim in question outweigh negative (side) effects.63
4. CONCLUSION: KEY FINDINGS AND THESES
Conclusion of this article contains key fi ndings and theses articulated with 
respect of previous chapters. The fi ndings and theses are as follows:
- The ambitious aim defi ned by the Digital Agenda for Europe concerning 
access to Internet speeds of above 30 Mbps and subscription to Internet 
connections above 100 Mbps until the year 2020 shall be considered as a 
legitimate aim.
- EU State aid rules as contained in the TFEU and legislative acts of the EU 
are well supported by the so called sectorial soft law.
- EU State aid rules are fl exible enough not to hinder the realization of the 
above-mentioned legitimate aim, however, there is no guarantee or autom-
atism in this regard since the ‘potential’ of EU State aid rules largely de-
pends on proper public policy.
- What is more, a realization of the above-mentioned aim does not depend on 
the interplay between broadband policy and state aid policy only, but also 
on interplay with various other public policies; even with public policies 
which, at least at fi rst sight, do not have a direct connection with broadband 
and state aid measures, like for example with spatial public policy.
63 See paragraphs 49 – 54 of the Commission – EU Guidelines for the application of State aid 
rules in relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks, OJ EU, C 25, 26. 1. 2013, p. 3.
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